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Abstract
The role of anonymity in giving is examined in a ¯eld experiment per-
formed in thirty Dutch churches. For a period of 29 weeks, the means by
which o®erings are gathered is determined by chance, prescribing for each
o®ering the use of either `closed' collection bags or open collection baskets.
When using baskets, attendees can see the contribution made by their direct
neighbors as well as the total amount already gathered.
Contributions to o®erings with an external cause initially increase by
10% when baskets are used, but this e®ect peters out over time. No e®ect
is found for o®erings with an internal cause. This result can be explained
by the presence of social incentives, but is also in line with recent studies
showing that asymmetric information about the quality of the charity leads
to increased contributions.
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11 Introduction
How does anonymity a®ect giving? Recently, this question has been addressed in
some public good experiments (Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Rege and Telle, 2004).
These studies ¯nd that contributions increase when subjects are unmasked, indi-
cating that | besides economic motivations | there is a role for social incentives
in giving. Subjects act on the circumstance that they can see what others give
and that their giving decisions are observed and potentially evaluated by others.
Intuition suggests that the extent to which subjects care about this evaluation
by others is dependent on the social ties that exist between them. Van Dijk et al.
(2002) prove that social ties can indeed form between subjects participating in
public good experiments, which validates the presence of social ties as a potential
explanation for the observed increase in contributions. However, the ties formed
between subjects in the laboratory are fundamentally di®erent from the ties that
exist between individuals in repeated real-life interactions. Consequently, it is
not clear to which extent laboratory ¯ndings on the e®ect of anonymity on giv-
ing decisions can be extrapolated to real-life situations. Ideally, one would like
to observe the e®ect of removing anonymity on contribution decisions made by
individuals in their natural habitat.
The ¯eld experiment in this paper tries to accomplish exactly this, by imple-
menting a change in the anonymity of giving to o®erings in thirty Baptist churches
in the Netherlands. These churches commonly collect at least two o®erings during
a service by means of `closed' collection bags. (See ¯gure 1a.) To examine the
role of anonymity, the following treatment is imposed. For a period of 29 weeks,
the familiar collection bags are randomly replaced with open collection baskets
(see ¯gure 1b). Contrary to the bags, the basket treatment provides attendees
with two additional pieces of information. First, nearest neighbors can observe
each other's contributions and second, attendees can see the total amount already
gathered. For each o®ering, baskets are assigned with probability 0.5 (treatment
group), bags are assigned otherwise (control group).
To test the hypothesis that anonymity a®ects contribution levels, I compare
the contributions in the treatment group with those in the control group. Using
nonparametric tests I ¯nd that the replacement of bags by baskets signi¯cantly
increases contributions to the second o®ering of a service, but that no e®ect is
2a. collection bag b. collection basket
Figure 1: Collection bags and baskets used.
found for the ¯rst o®ering. This ¯nding is corroborated by subsequent economet-
ric analysis of the data. Estimates indicate that the treatment increases proceeds
of the second o®ering by as much as 10 percent, but that this e®ect peters out
over time. Possible explanations for the di®erence in treatment e®ect use the fact
that the ¯rst o®ering's proceeds are always earmarked to the parish itself (public
good), whereas the second o®erings often serves causes outside the own parish
(charity good). One explanation is that social incentives have a di®erent e®ect
when the o®ering serves an external cause. An alternative explanation argues that
whereas every attendee knows the value of the public good, not everybody will
be familiar with the charity good. Therefore, in a non-anonymous context, asym-
metric information may lead to higher contributions to external causes when the
attendees who contribute ¯rst have an incentive to signal their private information
about the quality of the cause. Additional analysis shows that the di®erence in
e®ect can indeed be traced back to the di®erence in internal and external causes.
Three churches provided detailed information on the coins that were collected
in each o®ering. These data show that when baskets are used, the portion of
small coins (up to 20 eurocent) declines as churchgoers shift to giving larger coins
(1 and 2 euro). This provides further evidence that social factors play a role in
non-anonymous contribution decisions.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 brie°y reviews results from exper-
iments and ¯eld studies as well as the (small) existing literature on giving in
churches. Section 3 gives the experimental setup. Data are presented in Section 4
and Section 5 contains the results. In Section 5.1 the e®ect of the basket-treatment
is identi¯ed non-parametrically. A panel data model to quantify the treatment
3e®ect is presented in Section 5.2 and estimated in Section 5.3. Section 6 analyzes
the e®ect of using baskets on the type of coins given. Section 7 concludes.
2 The role of anonymity in giving
Before proceeding to the experiment, I brie°y review previous work on the role of
anonymity in contribution decisions to a public good or to charity.
2.1 Experimental and ¯eld studies
A couple of studies on public good experiments have recently investigated the
role of anonymity in giving (Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Rege and Telle, 2004;
GÄ achter and Fehr, 1999). Their main conclusion is that removing anonymity
leads to increased contributions. GÄ achter and Fehr (1999) note that when \the
opportunity for social exchange is combined with some minimal social familiarity
there is a substantial increase in contribution levels." (p. 352). In line with this,
Ho®man, McCabe and Smith (1996) ¯nd that in experimental dictator games
o®ers are lowered as the social distance between the experimental subjects and
the experimental leader increases.
Explanations commonly given to explain these greater contributions when sub-
jects are identi¯ed point to the presence of social incentives like prestige, receiv-
ing social approval, avoiding shame, social comparison and/or fairness. Harbaugh
(1998a, b) shows the positive e®ect of category reporting using ¯eld data on fund
raising. His explanation is that the prestige, derived from having the amount of
a donation publicly known, has a positive e®ect on an individual's contribution
decision. Masclet et al. (2003) ¯nd that the opportunity for agents to express
disapproval of others decisions increases contribution levels.1 Field evidence by
Haan and Kooreman (2002) suggests that individuals may experience a strong
moral obligation to pay the price asked in settings where they are free to choose
their contribution. Fairness considerations in°uence the decision-making process
if individuals value how their contribution relates to some \fair" standard, which
itself is some function of the contributions of others (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000;
Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, and Fehr and GÄ achter, 2000). Individuals who care
1See Bowles and Gintis (2003) for an analytical model showing that shame can increase the
level of cooperation in a group.
4about how their contribution compares to the contributions of others are led by
motivations of social comparison.
In the churches, prestige might lead to higher contributions when baskets are
used, since only baskets provide the necessary identi¯cation of an individual's
contribution by others.2 Churchgoers searching for social approval may seize the
opportunity given by the baskets to show that they \do their part" and increase
their contribution. They might however be wary to overdo it for reasons of fairness
and social comparison, since deviating too much from an implicitly agreed upon
`standard' amount may trigger negative reactions. In this way the identi¯cation
provided by the baskets may increase average contributions when social approval
and shame are important motives.
Two di®erences between public good experiments and the current setup have to
be mentioned. First, in the studies mentioned, identi¯cation in the non-anonymity
condition is global, in the sense that a subject's contribution is revealed to all
other participants. The current setup provides local identi¯cation, because only
nearest neighbors can identify each others contributions. Second, the order of
moves in the basket o®erings is inherently sequential instead of simultaneous.
Sequential play may help to sustain cooperation when a substantial fraction of
the subjects are conditional cooperators (Houser and Kurzban, 2003).3 Further-
more, in the presence of asymmetric information about the quality of the cause,
sequential play gives ¯rst movers the possibility to signal private information to
followers. Vesterlund (2003) provides a theoretical model on sequential fundrais-
ing showing that announcement of contributions can be optimal when there is
imperfect information about the value of the good. Potters, Sefton and Vester-
lund (2003) experimentally show that leading-by-example increases contributions
in an environment where a leader has private information about the returns from
contributing. List and Lucking-Reiley (2002) report the positive e®ect of publicly
announcing amounts of `seed money', indicating that individuals take the amount
already given by others into account in making their own contribution decision.
This ¯eld experiment has some advantages relative to laboratory experiments.
2This is not fully true. Individuals could in fact choose to voluntarily show their contribution
to their neighbors before dropping it into the bag. However, it does not seem likely that this
plays an important role in practice.
3Andreoni, Brown and Vesterlund (2002) look at fairness considerations in a two-person
sequential public good game.
5First, church attendees do not primarily choose to participate in an experiment,
they choose whether or not to go to church.4 Second, attendees have made for
years the contribution decision that is under investigation. As a result, there is no
doubt that they understand the procedure and moreover, pre-experimental data
are available for analysis. Finally, church attendees donate money they earned in
their daily life instead of money given to them by the experimenter. A disadvan-
tage is that individual contributions cannot be observed because for each o®ering
only aggregate amounts are reported. This makes it for example impossible to
pin down precisely the number of people that make non-zero contributions.
2.2 Literature on giving in churches
The number of studies dealing with giving in churches are relatively few. Most of
the existing studies focus on group-size e®ects by looking at per-member rates of
annual giving. Sullivan (1985), Stonebraker (1993) and Zaleski and Zech (1994) all
report a negative relationship between the number of members and per-member
rates of annual giving.5 Yet it is hard to interpret these results as evidence that
free riding increases in group size. Zaleski and Zech (1996) for example put for-
ward that for small parishes, members may agree to collectively share congrega-
tion costs. Since these costs do not increase proportionately with membership, an
increase in membership leads to a drop in per capita giving. Alternative explana-
tions are that the congregation size is endogenous, that church members feel that
the quality of the services decreases as the number of members increases (Ian-
naccone, 1998) or that public good considerations are minor in giving decisions
because members \make a bargain with God" (Tullock, 1996).
A notable di®erence between the present study and previous studies is that the
data I examine are weekly contributions to o®erings by church attendees instead
of annual contributions by church members. This gives the opportunity to use
intra-church variation in the number of attendees to assess a possible group size
e®ect. In addition, I get rid of a host of confounding factors like e.g. the above
mentioned cost sharing argument.
4The assumption that no-one alters this decision due to the introduction of baskets seems
reasonable.
5Reported in Iannaccone (1998). Lipford (1995) found no evidence of a group size e®ect on
giving, but was criticized by Zaleski and Zech (1996) for using a °awed speci¯cation.
63 Experimental design
3.1 Selection procedure
An invitation letter was sent to all 89 Baptist parishes in the Netherlands. This
letter stated in general terms that the University of Groningen intended to start
a research project on church o®erings and that participating parishes could each
receive a compensation of e300. Parishes should return a reply form if they were
interested to participate in the project.6 The questionnaire and the instructions
that were sent to the local church councils used a neutral language. In particular,
no reference was made to the role of anonymity in giving. Of the 45 parishes
that reacted positively, 30 were selected for participation, based on the number
of o®erings during service and geographical dispersion. The sample is not biased
toward particular small or large parishes.7
All selected parishes have service on Sunday morning and most of them have
two o®erings per service. Commonly, collection bags are used to gather the pro-
ceeds.8 Two parishes have standard an exit o®ering that is gathered at the end of
the service when attendees leave the building. One parish only rarely has a second
o®ering.9 Celebration of the Lord's supper { which in most parishes takes place
monthly { results in an additional (third) o®ering during service in 21 parishes. At
the Sunday of Easter and Pentecost, 3 and 2 churches, respectively, have only one
o®ering with a special cause. The proceeds of these so-called `gratitude o®erings'
are as a rule far above average.
In each selected parish, someone was appointed to coordinate the project (in
most instances the treasurer). Besides ¯lling out the questionnaire and gathering
historical data, his or her task during the experimental period was to act as
experimental leader, looking after the correct implementation of the setup. He
instructed the deacons and made sure that in each service the number of attendees
6The amount of e300 is not unreasonable, since in order to receive this amount, parishes not
only had to implement the experimental design, but they also had to collect historical information
on the proceeds and cause of each individual o®ering held from 1995 onward and furthermore
answer a questionnaire with general questions about the parish and the parishioners.
7The (rural) northern part of the country is somewhat overrepresented in the sample, re-
°ecting the fact that a large number of Baptist parishes are located in this part of the country.
The number of members of the churches in the sample varies from 26 to 384, with the median
at 130. In general, an individual member is personally acquainted with a large fraction of the
other members.
8An exception is formed by the extra o®ering gathered after having celebrated the Lord's
supper, which is sometimes gathered by means of a plate (10 churches) or a mug (one church).
9This was only noticed after the beginning of the experimental period.
7was counted. After service, he ¯lled out a form with questions regarding the
particularities of the service and the o®erings.
Before the start of the experiment, the appointed person in each church re-
ceived a randomized scheme indicating for each o®ering by which means it had to
be gathered. These schemes were constructed as follows. For each o®ering, the
Gauss random number generator drew from a U[0;1] distribution; values larger
than 0.5 resulted in the o®ering receiving the treatment. Note that in this way, it
can happen that none, one or both o®erings in one service are collected by means
of a basket. Most churches informed their members in advance that o®erings could
be taken in by either bags or baskets. In some parishes this was communicated
during a service or other meeting, and in other parishes a message appeared in
the church periodical. The necessary baskets were sent to the churches.10
Baptists form a relatively small denomination in the Netherlands. With the
¯rst parishes already being founded around 1840, they now form an integral part
of Dutch society. The parishes considered are a±liated to the national Baptist
federation, but have a large degree of autonomy in organizing their services. Due
to this, changes in aspects of the service like the introduction of baskets to gather
o®erings are more easily implemented than would have been the case in e.g. the
Reformed or Catholic churches in the Netherlands, which are more hierarchically
organized. The o®erings represent on average 10 to 25% of total revenues of a
parish which further comprise regular bank payments by the members, bequests
and rents.11
3.2 Order of moves
At the beginning of service, one of the deacons announces to the congregation the
number and the cause of the o®erings that will be held. Just before the actual
gathering, the minister makes an second announcement. One of more deacons pick
up a collection bag from the table in front of the church, which is then passed in
10In the vast majority of the parishes, visitors did not know in advance for which particular
o®erings replacement took place. In six churches, visitors were told at the beginning of service
whether bags or baskets were used for the o®erings in that service.
11In some parishes it also happens that a small minority of members makes (for reasons of
tax deduction) regular payments by bank explicitly labeled `o®ering contribution' instead of
contributing to the o®erings during service. This lowers the observed average contribution per
attendee. This does not a®ect the non-parametric e®ects which I will carry out at level of
individual parishes; in the econometric estimation, the e®ect is absorbed by the church-speci¯c
¯xed e®ect. The same is true for the possible endogeneity of the church selection decision.
8the following way: Each deacon gives his bag to a visitor; (s)he makes his or her
contribution and passes the bag to the person next to him or her. This procedure
is repeated until the last person in the row has made his contribution. The bag is
then passed to the next row. This procedure repeats until all attendees have had
the opportunity to make a donation.12 In most churches (26), the two o®erings
are taken in simultaneously, that is, the deacon hands out the ¯rst collection bag,
waits until the churchgoer has passed the bag and then hands out the second
collection bag to the same churchgoer.
3.3 O®ering causes
In each church, the cause of the ¯rst o®ering is the parish itself; the cause of the
second o®ering changes weekly and varies from parish to parish. The causes of the
second o®ering can be divided into four categories. The ¯rst category comprises
all o®erings serving an internal cause. Examples are o®erings for church building
or renovation; o®erings for bearing costs of sending °owers to elderly members or
for evangelical work. The second category consists of o®erings meant to fund (one
of) the tasks of the national Baptist federation. The third category includes causes
that have an indirect link to the own parish, like partner communities in Eastern
Europe or missionaries sent out to developing countries. The last category consists
of all causes outside the sphere of in°uence of the own parish, like for example
o®erings for Amnesty International or the Leprosy Fund. Thus the ¯rst o®ering
has a public good character, whereas the second o®ering either has a public good
character (in case of an internal cause) or more the character of a charity good
(in case of an external cause).13
4 Data
The experimental period lasted for 29 Sundays, in the time period from March 3,
to September 15, 2002. In one parish, the experiment ran till September 22 and
in another till September 29, since in these parishes a few services were cancelled.
12During the gathering, the organ plays and possibly the congregation sings a song.
13Notice that in case an individual derives utility from the total amount his/her church donates
to the external cause, his utility is positively a®ected by the amount donated by others, as in a
public good situation.
9One parish left the sample after three weeks14 and was replaced by another in
which the experimental period started at May 5 and ended at November 17.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
For the ¯rst o®ering 834 observations are available and for the second 791.
Tables 1 contains summary statistics on the ¯rst and second o®ering. The table
shows that per-attendee proceeds are on average 23% higher for the ¯rst o®ering
and that the distribution is skewed to the right for the ¯rst as well as the second
o®ering. The mean values of the dummy variables show that | as a result of the
randomization | about half of the ¯rst as well as the second o®erings is gathered
by means of bags, and the other half by means of baskets. The table further shows
that in about 20% of the services an additional third o®ering is held (\is 3rd");
and in about 12% of the services an exit o®ering (\is exit"), which in half of the
cases is meant for missionary work. These variables are included in the empirical
analysis to account for the possible e®ect of additional o®erings on the proceeds
of the ¯rst two o®erings. Exit o®erings meant for missionary work are taken up
separately, since they are often announced one week in advance.
The dummy \simultaneous" indicates whether the ¯rst o®ering is directly fol-
lowed by the second, which is true in about 81% of the services. The fact that there
is no time lag between the two contribution decisions may a®ect the amount given
in each of the two o®erings.15 A few o®erings receive a special recommendation or
bear a relationship with the character of the service. Since recommendations are
directly aimed at increasing the proceeds of an o®ering and a relation between the
sermon and the o®ering cause increases the attendees' awareness of the o®ering,
both are included in the empirical analysis.
Dummies for the presence of additional musicians (\music"), or co®ee for free
after service (\co®ee") are included to pick up a possible \good mood" e®ect of
hearing music and having the prospect of co®ee. One's mood may also be a®ected
by the amount of sunshine on a given day. \Sun" gives the daily hours of sunshine
as a percentage of the maximum amount of possible sunshine one could obtain.16
14This parish ceased participation because the treasurer of this parish had to quit his job on
personal grounds and could not ¯nd a successor.
15In non-simultaneous o®erings, the ¯rst o®ering commonly takes place before the preaching
and the second after the preaching.
16This maximum amount increases as days get longer. To take into account the geographical
dispersion of the parishes, I use information from ¯ve di®erent weather stations (provided by
10The \own minister" dummy is included to pick up possible e®ects of the preacher
on the perceived quality of the service, resulting in more or less generosity. The
\special service" dummy equals one if the service has a special character, like
e.g. baptizing services and services in which a new minister is installed. These
services are characterized by a relatively large number of guests. The dummy for
family services indicates whether a service has the character of a low-threshold
family service, which are attended by an above average number of children who
are likely to have a downward e®ect on average per-attendee contributions. The
\evening service" dummy equals one if on the same Sunday a service is held in
the evening hours. The opportunity to visit an evening service is seized by some
parishioners, especially youth, to opt out for the morning service. Thus having
an evening service may change the composition of the parishioners present in the
morning service.
The dummy \Chr. celebration" equals one if the service is held on Christian
celebration days like Easter and Pentecost. Besides a®ecting the number of people
who go to church, attendees consider these days as special, which may in°uence
their donation. In some churches, so-called gratitude o®erings are collected on
these special days to give attendees the opportunity to express their gratitude. In
general, the contributions to gratitude o®erings are far above average. O®erings
held following the celebration of the Lord's Supper are also possibly used by
attendees to express their gratitude. For these reasons, both a \gratitude" and
a \Lord's Supper" dummy are included. With regard to the o®ering causes, the
table makes clear that almost all (99.4%) of the ¯rst o®erings have the own parish
as cause; of the second o®erings, 30% serves speci¯c internal causes, 56% the
Baptist federation and 7% other causes outside the own parish.
Table 2 presents summary statistics on the average per-attendee contributions
to the ¯rst and second o®erings for all parishes in the sample. Moreover, a dis-
tinction is made in o®erings gathered by means of bags and o®erings gathered by
means of baskets. Large di®erences in average contributions are observed between
di®erent parishes.
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
the Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute).
115 Results
5.1 Nonparametric tests
To assess the e®ect of using baskets on average o®ering proceeds, I ¯rst calculate
Wilcoxon rank sum statistics. Gratitude o®erings and o®erings held after celebra-
tion of the Lord's Supper are dropped from the sample because of their special
character. I distinguish between the e®ect on ¯rst and on second o®erings. In a
two-sided test, the null hypothesis of no treatment e®ect is rejected for the second
o®ering but not for the ¯rst o®ering (p-value = 0:000014 and 0:1800, respec-
tively).17 For each parish, the calculated standard normal z-values are reported
in the last column of table 2. At the level of individual parishes, large di®erences
are observed. For the second o®ering, all signi¯cant di®erences (7 parishes on a
10% level) point to a positive e®ect from the introduction of baskets on average
proceeds. For the ¯rst o®ering, signi¯cantly more is raised by baskets in three
parishes but in one parish the baskets have a strong negative e®ect on average
proceeds. Table 2 also reports for each parish the t-statistics obtained by per-
forming a di®erence in mean test.18 The patterns found are roughly similar to
those found by using the Wilcoxon rank sum test, except for parish nr. 5.19
Both the Wilcoxon rank sum test and the di®erence in mean test assume
that the observations are independent. In practice however, there might be a
dependence between o®erings held in the same parish, because from week to week
more or less the same people visit service and, moreover, these regular visitors
tend to take the same seats. The Wilcoxon signed rank test is an alternative that
17The calculation is as follows: For ¯rst o®erings, denote for each parish the total number of
times a bag is used by m, the number of times a basket is used by n and the sum of the ranks
of the basket observations by Rn. Since the total of n + m exceeds 10 in each parish cases, the





under the null hypothesis of no treatment e®ect. p-values for the general e®ect are obtained by
aggregating the Rn values of all parishes. The procedure for second o®erings is similar.











n+m¡2 and j = 1;2 denoting whether the o®erings are ¯rst or second o®erings,
and yj;bag (yj;basket) per-attendee proceeds averaged over all jths o®erings gathered by means
of bags (baskets) during the experimental period.
19Data on the number and type of coins and bank notes show that in parish nr. 5, once a
month a note of e100 is contributed. Each time, the note is contributed to an o®ering which is
gathered by means of a bag and whose cause is the parish itself. Since the note increases the
total proceeds with about 200%, the phenomenon leads to a number of outliers for which the
di®erence in mean test is more sensitive than the Wilcoxon rank sum test. Pre-experimental
data for this parish show that the act of giving a e100-note once a month already started in the
year 2000 and is not a reaction to the introduction of baskets as a means to gather o®erings.
12does not assume independence. The test uses for each parish the observed paired
percentage di®erence of average basket o®ering proceeds and average bag o®ering
proceeds. According to this two-sided test, the p-values of no treatment e®ect are
0.2096 and 0.0727 for the ¯rst and second o®ering, respectively.
5.2 Econometric analysis
The ¯eld character of the experiment entails that one has to account for a num-
ber of covariates other than the treatment variable that potentially in°uence the
o®ering proceeds and that vary between services (e.g. the number of attendees)
or between o®erings (e.g. the cause of the o®ering and the way in which the of-
fering is recommended). I will call variables that vary between services \service
speci¯c" and variables that vary within services \o®ering speci¯c". In order to
assess the e®ects of anonymity while accounting for these covariates, the following
panel regression is estimated
lnyit;j = ®i;j + ¯jBASKETit;j + ¯3BASKETit;1 ¢ Dit;j
+
P4
k=1(³k + Ák;jBASKETit;j) ¢ Tk(t) + ±j lnqit;j
+ µ0xit;j + (Ã0
1(1 ¡ Dit;j) + Ã0
2Dit;j) ¢ zit;j + ²it;j;
(1)
where the logarithm of the average per-attendee contribution yit;j to the jth of-
fering in week t of the experimental period in parish i is the dependent variable;
i 2 f1;:::;30g; j 2 f1;2g; t 2 f1;:::;29g. With regard to the disturbances ²it;j,
note that the ¯rst and second o®ering in the same service are likely to be corre-
lated. For example, the presence of generous people will be bene¯cial to both the
¯rst and the second o®ering. If attendees determine in advance the sum of money
they bring with them to church, only deciding during service how to split this
sum between o®erings, this induces a negative correlation. Furthermore, since
the dependent variable is (logarithm of) the average contribution per attendee,
the errors terms are heteroscedastic, with variance decreasing in the number of
attendees. To allow both for correlation and heteroscedasticity, the error struc-
ture is modeled as follows: var(²it;j) = ¾jj=qit; cov(²it;1;²it;2) = ¾12=qit and
cov(²it;j;²vw;k) = 0 whenever v 6= i or t 6= w, j;k 2 f1;2g.
The coe±cients ®i;j absorb church speci¯c ¯xed e®ects. Moreover, by adding
a subscript j, I allow the e®ect of church speci¯c variables to di®er between the
¯rst and second o®ering. BASKETit;j is a dummy variable indicating whether
baskets are used to gather the o®ering. The parameters ¯1 and ¯2 thus measure
13the e®ect of switching from bags to baskets. The dummy variable Dit;j takes
on the value 1 if the observation under consideration is a second o®ering and 0
otherwise, so Dit;j = 1 i®. j = 2. As a result, ¯3 estimates the e®ect of using a
basket in the ¯rst o®ering on the proceeds of the second o®ering.20
The functions Tk(t) represent non-overlapping time-intervals de¯ned as Tk(t) =
I[6k < t · 6(k+1)], k = 1;:::;4, with I[¢] an indicator function. The coe±cients
³i pick up possible e®ects of in°ation or changes in the income of parishioners dur-
ing the experimental period. The products of these time intervals with the basket
dummy are added to incorporate changes in the treatment e®ect over time, where
again a distinction is made between the ¯rst and second o®ering. The number of
attendees is given by qit;j such that 1+±j re°ects the percentage increase in total
proceeds by a one percent increase in the number of attendees. xit;j is a vector of
service-speci¯c binary variables (is 2nd, is 3rd, is exit, mission exit, simultaneous,
music, co®ee, family service, special service) and the continuous variable \sun".
The vector zit;j contains binary variables that are o®ering speci¯c (recommen-
dation, relation, federation, external, Eastern Europe, gratitude)21 or that might
for some reason have a di®erent e®ect on the ¯rst than on the second o®ering
(own minister, evening service and Chr. celebration).22 For \own minister" this
reason is that the minister receives his salary from the parishes' internal funds.
The possibility of an evening service might lead to a selection e®ect. Since 63% of
the evening services have only one o®ering (usually for the parish itself), parish-
ioners who normally visit the evening service may have another attitude to the
second than to the ¯rst o®ering. Christian celebrations might have a larger e®ect
on second o®erings that are held after the preaching.
5.3 Estimates
The results are based on 791 services with at least two o®erings, leading to a total
of 1582 included observations.23 Estimates are given in table 3. The ¯rst column
contains least squares estimation results for the model without a time trend for the
20Since in some of the parishes attendees know in advance how the second o®ering will be
collected, one might argue that also a parameter measuring the e®ect of using a basket in the
second o®ering on the proceeds of the ¯rst o®ering should be added. However, since it turns out
that ¯3 is insigni¯cant across speci¯cations, the same is likely to be true for the reverse e®ect.
21Internal causes act as reference category.
22A speci¯cation test did not ¯nd a di®erence in e®ect for the variables in xit;j.
23Contrary to the analysis in Section 5.1, gratitude o®erings and o®erings following celebration
of the Lord's Supper are included in the sample.
14treatment and neglecting heteroscedasticity in the error terms. Column (2) gives
the results of a basic regression with heteroscedasticity taken into account. In
this regression, the only explanatory variables added besides the basket dummy
are dummies for the o®ering causes and a service speci¯c group size e®ect. In
column (3), the same model as in (1) is estimated but now with heteroscedasticity
taken into account. The complete model is estimated in column (4), addressing
heteroscedasticity and incorporating a linear time trend.
In line with the pattern revealed by the nonparametric tests in the previous
section, the four speci¯cations provide no evidence of a treatment e®ect on the
average proceeds of the ¯rst o®ering, but they do show a highly signi¯cant increase
in those of the second. For the complete model, the initial increase in proceeds
of the second o®ering by the introduction is estimated at 10.1%.24 This increase
is smaller as in Andreoni and Petrie (2004), who ¯nd an initial increase of about
35%. Among other things, one reason for this di®erence might be that in the
current setup, identi¯cation is local instead of global.
For the second o®ering, the number of periods since the start of the experi-
mental period has a signi¯cant (p-value = 0.018) and sizeable negative e®ect on
the treatment e®ect: The e®ect of using baskets for the second o®ering peters out
over time. It is tempting to relate the diminishing e®ect in time to the ¯nding in
public good experiments that contributions decline with repetition (Isaac, McCue
and Plott, 1985). This relation however is somewhat problematic since there is no
¯nal round in the current setup (o®erings were still held after the experimental
period ended) nor can the second o®ering be considered as a pure public good.
A similar negative time-e®ect is found in Haan and Kooreman (2002), which also
lacks a clearly de¯ned ¯nal round. It is unclear what causes the particular large
drop in weeks 19 till 24. In general, contributions increase over time. The esti-
mates imply an annual increase in o®ering proceeds of about 8.4%. The means of
gathering of the ¯rst o®ering does not have an e®ect on the proceeds of the second
o®ering. The overall e®ect of using baskets (calculated by summing ^ ¯1; ^ ¯2 and
^ ¯3) is signi¯cantly positive at the 5-percent level. The hypothesis that the e®ect
of using baskets is the same for the ¯rst and second o®ering is clearly rejected.
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
24e¯2 ¡ 1 = 0:101.
15Looking at the other coe±cients in column (4), one sees a negative group size
e®ect as measured by the ±j's: a 1 percent increase in the number of attendees
leads for both o®erings only to a 0.7 percent increase in total proceeds. This
is consonant with earlier empirical studies on giving in churches. A possible
explanation is that on Sundays with relatively few attendees, the people who come
are the most dedicated and most generous ones. The presence of an additional
third o®ering leads to a reduction in average proceeds of the ¯rst two o®erings of
8%, but no such e®ect occurs for additional exit o®erings. As expected, average
contributions are lower when the service is a family service and people give more
when a service is held at Easter or Pentecost. The own minister leading the service
does not a®ect contributions.
Interestingly, recommending the o®ering increases contributions to the sec-
ond o®ering by 28% but has no e®ect on the proceeds of the ¯rst o®ering. The
same goes for the o®ering cause being related with the preaching. This shows
that parishioners are sensitive to recommendations. Partly this may be caused
because an appeal is made to their social obligation to contribute. Gratitude
o®erings bring in 220% (84%) more if held as ¯rst (second) o®ering. Having an
evening service on the same day does not a®ect average contributions to the ¯rst
o®ering, but increases the average proceeds of the second o®ering by 11%, suggest-
ing a negative correlation between being inclined to attend the evening instead
of the morning service and the willingness to contribute to the second o®ering.
Finally, proceeds of the second o®ering are much higher (+45%) when the cause
is in Eastern Europe; higher when the cause is an external one (+8%) and slightly
lower when the o®ering serves the national federation (¡4%).
How do the results in this and the previous section relate to the experimental
evidence on anonymity in giving? The positive treatment e®ect found for the sec-
ond o®ering is in accordance with the experimental results of both Andreoni and
Petrie (2004) and Rege and Telle (2004). Contrary to these however is the absence
of a treatment e®ect for the ¯rst o®ering. Is this di®erence due to the fact that the
¯rst o®ering has the character of a public good whereas the second o®ering often
serves an external cause? In order to analyze this question, I estimated equation
(1) separately for two subsets of the data. The ¯rst subset comprises the services
16that have a second o®ering with an internal cause; the second subset comprises
the subset of services that have a second o®ering with an external cause. Esti-
mates are given in columns (5) and (6) of table 3, respectively. Interestingly, the
estimates show that the signi¯cance of the treatment e®ect for the second o®ering
is persistent for the subset of external second o®erings, but not for the subset with
internal second o®erings. Thus the basket-treatment only has a positive e®ect on
contributions when the o®ering has the character of a charity.
There are a number of behavioral explanations for this result. First, most
churchgoers make | in addition to the amounts given to the o®erings | regu-
lar bank payments to the parish. Since these amounts are not observed by the
other parishioners, one can always defend low contributions to internal o®erings
by claiming that one compensates for this by one's bank payments. Having an
excuse might prevent people from feeling ashamed. For external o®erings, no such
excuse is available. Second, one can argue that external o®erings give better op-
portunities to exhibit unsel¯sh behavior, since there is no direct monetary payo®
to the contributor.
A third explanation does not use social incentives to explain the di®erence
but points to the possible role of asymmetric information when the o®ering has
the character of a charity. When the o®ering has the character of the public
good, everybody knows its value, because all attendees are members of the same
church. O®erings for charity however serve each week a di®erent cause and not
everybody will be familiar with that cause. In this case, attendees with private
information about the quality of the charity have an incentive to signal their
information to others in order to stimulate them to contribute. The opportunity to
\lead-by-example" can reduce the free-rider problem and increases contributions
in an environment where a leader has private information about the quality of a
charity.25 Potters, Sefton and Vesterlund (2003) provide experimental evidence of
this. In the current setup however, we cannot identify whether the di®erence in
treatment e®ect is caused by social incentives, asymmetric information or both.
With regard to the other explanatory variables it is interesting to note that
the \Chr. celebration" dummy and the \gratitude" dummy are only signi¯cant
for the subset of internal o®erings. The reason for this may be that gratitude
25I am grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this point.
17for the resurrection of Christ ¯nds a natural expression in contributing an extra
amount to the own parish, but not in contributing to e.g. Amnesty International.
The \recommendation" dummy on the other hand is much larger for the subset
of external o®erings, lending support to the hypothesis that making an appeal to
the moral obligation of the attendees has more e®ect when the cause is external.
6 E®ect on type of coins contributed
As mentioned, information on the number and the type of coins collected is avail-
able for three parishes. For two parishes this information is available for ¯rst as
well as second o®erings and for the other only for the ¯rst o®erings. For the latter
parish, information is also available for the pre-experimental period.26 Histograms
and cumulative distribution functions are given in ¯gure 2.
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
The panels a, b and c all show the same pattern: as compared to closed of-
ferings, collecting o®erings by means of baskets leads to a decrease in the average
fraction of small coins (1, 2, 5, 10 and 20 eurocents) and an increase in the average
fraction of large coins (1 and 2 euro).27 For parishes a and b, the cumulative dis-
tribution when using baskets ¯rst-order stochastically dominates the cumulative
distribution function for o®erings that use bags. For parish a, the average frac-
tion for the time period before the outset of the experiment are also depicted. As
compared to the pre-experimental period, a shift to giving larger coins occurred in
the experimental period.28 The cumulative distribution function of bag o®erings
during the experimental period ¯rst-order stochastically dominates the cumula-
tive distribution function of bag o®erings in the pre-experimental period. Table 4
shows the percentage increase in the share of coins of a certain type (in the total
number of coins collected) when baskets are used.29 The joint-signi¯cance test
shows that the increase in 1 and 2 euro coins is signi¯cant at the 5%-level.
26The pre-experimental period comprises the months January and February 2002; the e®ect
of the experimental period may be confounded with the replacement of the Dutch guilder by
the euro in January 2002.
27A Â2-test for di®erence in distributions delivers for parishes a, b and c p-values of 9:7¢10¡8,
0.0559 and 0.0549, respectively.
28p-value = 3:3 ¢ 10¡4.
29For each type of coin and for each parish, the ratio of the number of coins of a certain type
relative to the total number of coins collected was calculated for each o®ering separately. These
ratios were ordered ¯rst and second o®erings) and signi¯cance was tested using a Wilcoxon rank
sum test.
18INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
Comparison of the coin distributions shows that people refrain from giving
small coins in favor of giving more valuable ones when baskets are used. Perhaps
attendees feel ashamed when giving substandard coins or try to receive social
approval by ostentatiously giving large coins. The fact that a similar shift is
observed when bag-o®erings during the experimental period are compared to bag-
o®erings in the pre-experimental period, indicates that attendees are to some
extent aware that their decisions are observed by the university.30
The large e®ect observed for parish a is remarkable, since it results from ob-
servations on ¯rst o®erings only. In light of the analysis in the previous section
this e®ect is unexpected. Apparently, there is yet some role for social incentives
in the attendees' decision to give to the ¯rst o®ering; these are not incentives to
give more, but to make the contribution look more. The results in this section
compare to the ¯ndings by Burnham (2003) who reports an upward shift in modal
gift in an experimental dictator game when the anonymity of subjects is removed.
7 Conclusions
This paper set out to investigate whether removing anonymity a®ects contribu-
tion decisions in a real-life environment. For a period of 29 weeks, o®erings in
thirty churches were randomly gathered either using collection bags or more open
baskets. The baskets enable local identi¯cation of contributors, giving social in-
centives like prestige, social approval, shame and social comparison the opportu-
nity to take e®ect. Furthermore, asymmetric information about the quality of the
cause may increase contributions when ¯rst-movers can increase the contribution
of others by signaling their private information.
I found, ¯rst, that non-anonymous collecting methods have a positive e®ect on
contributions to external causes (charity), whereas no e®ect is found for contribu-
tions to internal causes (public good). Second, the e®ect of removing anonymity
peters out over time. Social incentives may have a di®erent impact when the
o®ering serves an external cause, because external causes give more possibilities
to exhibit unsel¯sh behavior or because regular bank payments give churchgoers
30One treasurer reported that some parishioners in his parish reacted to the research project
by saying: \For what reason does the university interfere in our a®airs?"
19an excuse to contribute less to o®erings with an internal cause. This may explain
the di®erent e®ect of the basket-treatment for internal and external o®erings. The
presence of asymmetric information provides an alternative explanation. Whereas
most attendees are familiar with the internal causes, information about the qual-
ity of external causes will not be common knowledge. This gives ¯rst-movers an
incentive to signal private information through their contributions. Within the
current framework, we cannot separately identify the e®ect of asymmetric infor-
mation and social incentives. A third ¯nding is that in both o®erings, people
shift to giving more valuable coins when anonymity is removed. This observation
is also made for ¯rst o®erings, which indicates that social incentives are of some
importance in contributing to public goods. Feeling ashamed about giving small
coins or the desire to receive social approval by giving larger coins might be a
possible factor that drives this shift.31 Note, however, that this result is based on
additional data from three churches only.
One caveat should be kept in mind in deriving general policy recommendations
for fund-raising institutions from the results presented here. Parishioners may
not be representative for the population of interest to fund-raisers because joining
church services may correspond to an attitude to giving that di®ers from that of
the population at large.32
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LS open 0.008 0.018
LS closed 0.000 0.019
o®erings
is 2nd 0.948 1.000
is 3rd 0.193 0.204
is exit 0.131 0.113






family service 0.024 0.023
special service 0.049 0.048
evening service 0.068 0.069
sun 40.132 39.736
Chr. celebration 0.064 0.063







Eastern Europe 0.002 0.010
Lord's Supper 0.008 0.037
gratitude 0.008 0.010







qit;j , with j = 1;2;
t = 1;2;:::;T for the time period and i = 1;2;:::;N as an index for the churches.
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































24Table 3: Estimation results (standard errors within parentheses).
internal external
OLS 2nd o®ering 2nd o®ering
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
basket 1st (¯1) 0.007 0.003 -0.006 0.028 0.020 0.007
(0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.023) (0.034) (0.031)
basket 2nd (¯2) 0.061** 0.041* 0.038* 0.096** 0.043 0.080*
(0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.028) (0.043) (0.036)
basket 1st on -0.009 -0.022 -0.008 -0.032 0.019
2nd o®. (¯3) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.025) (0.021)
change in e®ect basket 1st
week 7-12 (Á1;1) -0.047 0.012 -0.064
(0.032) (0.046) (0.043)
week 13-18 (Á1;2) -0.054y -0.068 -0.036
(0.031) (0.045) (0.041)
week 19-24 (Á1;3) -0.051 -0.041 -0.026
(0.034) (0.051) (0.044)
week 25-30 (Á1;4) -0.018 0.016 -0.002
(0.033) (0.050) (0.042)
change in e®ect basket 2nd
week 7-12 (Á2;1) -0.050 -0.026 -0.009
(0.036) (0.050) (0.047)
week 13-18 (Á2;2) -0.050 -0.027 -0.046
(0.037) (0.054) (0.047)
week 19-24 (Á2;3) -0.137** -0.113y -0.145**
(0.041) (0.059) (0.053)
week 25-30 (Á2;4) -0.075y 0.035 -0.091y
(0.039) (0.057) (0.049)
general time e®ect
week 7-12 (³1) -0.011 -0.024 -0.002 -0.038 0.012
(0.019) (0.018) (0.022) (0.033) (0.028)
week 13-18 (³2) 0.004 0.007 0.032 0.081* 0.006
(0.019) (0.018) (0.022) (0.034) (0.028)
week 19-24 (³3) -0.019 -0.017 0.022 0.047 0.003
(0.021) (0.020) (0.024) (0.038) (0.031)
week 25-30 (³4) 0.028 0.026 0.044y 0.037 0.031
(0.021) (0.019) (0.024) (0.038) (0.030)
service speci¯c variables
is 3rd -0.074** -0.069** -0.071** -0.035 -0.081**
(0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.026) (0.019)
is exit -0.015 -0.029 -0.032 -0.057 -0.020
(0.044) (0.039) (0.039) (0.080) (0.050)
mission exit -0.015 0.035 0.041 0.077
(0.074) (0.087) (0.087) (0.137)
simultaneous -0.043 0.007 0.009 0.016 -0.018
(0.031) (0.027) (0.027) (0.035) (0.045)
music 0.012 0.014 0.014 0.019 -0.002
(0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (0.033) (0.037)
co®ee -0.011 -0.005 -0.005 0.005 -0.016
(0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.023) (0.018)
family -0.054 -0.075* -0.076* -0.092 -0.072
(0.042) (0.037) (0.037) (0.062) (0.048)
special service 0.005 -0.009 -0.010 0.008 -0.015
(0.030) (0.023) (0.023) (0.041) (0.028)
sun 0.000 -0.005 -0.006 -0.033 0.001





OLS 2nd o®ering 2nd o®ering
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1st o®ering speci¯c variables
lnq (±1) -0.277** -0.271** -0.268** -0.177** -0.317**
(0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.054) (0.045)
recommendation 0.003 -0.021 -0.017 -0.011 -0.017
(0.061) (0.049) (0.049) (0.066) (0.068)
relation 0.018 -0.020 -0.019 -0.111y 0.053
(0.059) (0.047) (0.047) (0.067) (0.063)
own minister 0.015 0.022 0.024 -0.014 0.042*
(0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.024) (0.020)
gratitude 1.123** 1.142** 1.163** 1.193**
(0.203) (0.180) (0.180) (0.257)
Chr. cel 0.082* 0.086** 0.084** 0.087* 0.032
(0.035) (0.029) (0.029) (0.036) (0.048)
evening service -0.008 0.006 0.001 -0.009 0.025
(0.044) (0.029) (0.029) (0.046) (0.040)
2nd o®ering speci¯c variables
lnq (±2) -0.249** -0.299** -0.312** -0.374** -0.281**
(0.037) (0.041) (0.042) (0.063) (0.054)
own minister -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 0.002 -0.003
(0.023) (0.020) (0.020) (0.029) (0.026)
federation -0.062** -0.093* -0.039* -0.037y
(0.020) (0.022) (0.019) (0.019)
external 0.040 0.118** 0.074* 0.081* 0.083*
(0.035) (0.040) (0.034) (0.034) (0.039)
Eastern Europe 0.228** 0.415** 0.367** 0.372** 0.360**
(0.080) (0.118) (0.100) (0.100) (0.109)
Lord's Supper 0.214** 0.098 0.102 0.114 -0.037
(0.051) (0.068) (0.068) (0.121) (0.098)
recommendation 0.161* 0.238** 0.244** 0.067 0.350**
(0.067) (0.056) (0.056) (0.077) (0.079)
relation 0.182* 0.267** 0.265** 0.293** 0.202*
(0.074) (0.062) (0.062) (0.087) (0.084)
gratitude 0.567** 0.604** 0.611** 0.738** 0.088
(0.088) (0.073) (0.073) (0.079) (0.230)
Chr. cel 0.208** 0.152** 0.145** 0.257** 0.088
(0.041) (0.039) (0.039) (0.051) (0.057)
evening service 0.089y 0.117** 0.102** 0.091 0.084y
(0.047) (0.036) (0.037) (0.056) (0.047)
overall e®ect baskets 0.059 0.044 0.016 0.116 0.031 0.106
[p-values] [0.057] [0.030] [0.743] [0.014] [0.660] [0.085]
di®erence in e®ect 0.054 0.038 0.038 0.068 0.023 0.073
[p-values] [0.011] [0.084] [0.025] [0.047] [0.650] [0.098]
Prob F-test
time e®ect 1st o®. | | | 0.364 0.379 0.563
time e®ect 2nd o®. | | | 0.018 0.155 0.038
Sample size 1582 1582 1582 1582 586 996
Notes: y Signi¯cant at the 10-percent level; ¤ Signi¯cant at the 5-percent level; ¤¤ Signi¯cant
at the 1-percent level.
Empty cells in columns (5) and (6) mean that there is no variation in the dummy variable in
the subsample considered or that the variable is the default value (as \federation" is in column
(6).
26Table 4: Percentage increase in the share of coins of a certain type (in the total
number of coins collected) when baskets are used.
type of coin
parish e0.50 e1 e2
(a) 5.9% 20.4%* 23.2%*
(b) -2.0% 11.7%* 30.9%**
(c) 3.1%y 2.5% 15.0%**
joint test (p-values) 0.2400 0.0291 0.0001
Note: y Signi¯cant at the 10-percent level;
¤ Signi¯cant at the 5-percent level;
¤¤ Signi¯cant at the 1-percent level
Parish a: ¯rst o®erings only; b, c: ¯rst
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Figure 2: Average number of coins of a certain type as a fraction of the total
number of coins given to bag and basket o®erings (left panels). Cumulative coin
distributions (right panels). Parish a: ¯rst o®erings only; b, c: ¯rst and second
o®erings combined.
28